The article explores the possibility of comprehending natural law, together with an alternative to the Schmittean political, through an inquiry into the layers of professional philosophy with a special focus on epistemology and analytic philosophy. inquiry into ideas mostly attributable to analytic philosophy (or philosophy of language), this ontology is also shown to function as an 'anti-onto'-logy -that is, as a direct (i.e. open, not hidden) ideological basis for modern political praxis. The analysis here also discloses the rivalry inside professional philosophy in relation to 'anti-onto'-logy, the latter finding its disciplinary origin(s) in language itself. It shows that at the level of professional philosophy there is a general trend that could be helpful in the attempt to revive natural law (Part IV).
INTRODUCTION
What we must first accept here is that the apparatus of the separation of lawmaking and the application of law in the parliamentary legislative state is analogous to the apparatus of deductive epistemology. It presents the image of the created law as the first step and, as a second step, law applied or tested in a concrete factual situation. As will be discussed later, this configuration preprograms a kind of anarchical "anything goes" type of process at the level of law.
In this context the stereotypical conception of Schmitt's extraordinary law giver (dictator or sovereign) for whom, as a matter of law, "anything goes", becomes debatable. Following the stereotype it should appear that here we are confronted with just two candidates to the throne of Schmittean sovereigntyparliament and executive. Nevertheless, in the aforementioned context another interpretation (although probably a secondary one 13 ) of Schmitt's decisionism is possible. This executive/administrator here could be understood acting not in a deductive manner but, in some sense, as an apolitical scientist in a more traditional sense, having no room for "anything goes" when confronted with autonomously appearing facts. This "sovereign" has no choice at his discretion: he has to decide what is inevitable (therefore his decision is also only a "decision"); he has to be the Schmittean sovereign and at the same time understand that he is not-although still masquerading as such. 12 Ibid., p. 70-71. 13 The Schmittean concept of the political is especially to be blamed for this non-primary position.
this space there is some kind of law, but it is something more like a quark in physics-it is impossible to, in some sense, separate it from physis, separate in a rationalistic sense, i.e. to rationalize this separation. For Agamben, a state of exception-being already something other than a state of mere/pure nature-is one where "factum and ius fade into each other" 15 and, we should add, without any possibility to decide/know what comes first and when ius would reward us with its appearance even as a "shadow side" of factum. Law just happens to contingently "come out" as something known, or, perhaps we might say it is "cached" by decision. But the fundamental underlying problem here is precisely this matter of our knowing and/or (?) deciding, in many respects starting from epistemology through ontology up to our political-legal condition. Poetically speaking, that is the divaricating "hidden tunnel" in the Schmittean castle of decisionism and therein we now will proceed. 14 
NATURAL SCIENCE AS THE POLITICAL EXILE OF NATURAL LAW
Post-fascist jurisprudence is marked by a concern for the loss and possible restoration of the conception of natural law. The phenomenon of fascism disclosed the real face of positivism-its camp-building and anarchistic potentials. However, until now the restoration of natural law in the domain of jurisprudence appears to be a complete failure-it is still "lost in jurisprudence".
But this does not mean that it is completely lost in our minds. Natural law exists and has always existed in a kind of exile in the form of natural science. To articulate the significance and newly developing perspectives of this situation, we should turn to the politically significant caesuras of modernity: the caesuras (1) in law and (2) of law. We must explore how these caesura-mechanisms, through the paths of modern epistemology and pro-idealist, pro-positivist and pro-anarchist trends therein, push natural law to the outskirts of its political exile.
The caesura in law refers to marking off the domain of nature in the more general domain of law initially understood as the ontological unity of natural law.
The result is total conceptual dis-function-an incapacity to conceive and conceptualize natural law. The Hobbesian 16 and post-Hobbesian separation of the planes of [the state of] nature and [the state of] law made such a tremendous impact through the evolution of modernity that post-modernity woke up to a complete incapacity to conceive natural law. The result is that the state of nature with its (natural) law (or, perhaps we could also call it the state of natural law)
does not appear to us as a real historical epoch. 17 We can conceive the state of state but the state of nature-and especially any law therein-is beyond the capabilities of the brainwashed mind of the modernity.
But what happens as a consequence of this separation of two states is that the anthropological and with it the political-dialectical 18 machine is set into motion.
The mechanism of the subsumption 19 of [the state of] nature through/in the institution 20 of the human sovereign, first of all, means nothing more or less than the human mastery of nature in its totality which, as a conception, first appears as a purely political one in the Schmittean sense of politics. It is the mastery of nature as bare life (or pure existence). In other words, if our bare life is constituted by 16 The Humean parallel in epistemology should also be kept in mind. 17 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 35-36. 18 Dialectics was always a political matter. 19 That is one of the meanings of the "marking off" which happens as the purification of the domain of law from nature the latter being subsumed into the figure of a sovereign. 20 This word here could be conceived as a verbal noun (then adjective "through" should be used) and as a substantive noun (then adjective "into" should be used).
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On a broader scale, the human mastery of nature is possible only when it is ideologically marked-off from the human world (initially regarded as the world of the human multitude) which afterwards takes the form of a society and a politicallegal state. We are today so prone to conceive of the human world as a society that we even depict the corresponding ideological configurations of the pre-modern, primitive times in our modern phraseology, which is also the effect of a conceptual dis-function. For example, it may be alleged that for the primitive mind natural law was akin to (or indistinguishable from) humanitarian law, thus meaning that nature was socialized and in this way made part of a society. 22 In our modern mutated phraseology, at best pre-modernity can be described as the epoch of nature-human symbiosis in socium.
But, at the dawn of modernity, nature was "thrown out" of a human world and a [new] society was born-a society after the social contract, which was a contract not only to end up with the state of nature but to end up with nature as part of a human world (i.e., in a way, to exclude nature from this world). Moreover, simultaneously, natural science was born. The question is: what exactly was born or made anew? Natural science is the matter of the laws of nature or, in other words, natural laws. The novelty was that those laws were no longer political; they lost their political significance. Therefore, what arose as "natural science" may also be regarded as the place of the political exile of natural law.
This birth was followed by the fundamental caesura of law-the division of law into the humanitarian and the scientific sectors, 23 although, according to the new paradigm, only the humanitarian (or human-made) should have remained. The latter event did not happen because, as simple as it is, natural law is difficult (if not impossible) to eliminate. By his free will and through the force of his decision the sovereign cannot change the law that "fire is hot". But, because of this immunity 21 In this paper two words could be chosen in this place -sense and perception (also, very rarely, the word experience could be used). Here the priority will be given to the former, although sometimes the latter could be used. Perception has more logocentrical connotations, while sense (especially as a verb) more clearly expresses this activity/process without any relation to mind activity. 22 from sovereign will and decision, natural law-now known as science-has gained a lot of prestige; and yet it was thrown into political exile while a new puppet lawgiver was created: humans and their state 24 . Through the use of science and the development of weaponry Schmittean politics arrived at the condition of the possibility of its perfection-i.e. the possibility of a Third World War-as the total elimination of physis, in which no one would be able to escape it in relation to his or her own physis.
But even though the anthropological machine never finally succeeded in fully neutralizing natural law at the level of the practice of science, such attempts were undertaken at the level of modern epistemology. It is as though nature, which in modernity has been given other names, such as "objects", "facts", "phenomena", "reality", etc., had undergone an attempt to wipe out of the scene of the play called "science", or at least to be provided with a secondary role in it while human or human reason should remain in the lead role. This attempt apparently was realized by an inversion of the inductive/empiricist paradigm of science with the deductive/logocentric one, thus paving the way for an anarchistic epistemology.
The explicit "founding fathers" of this development are Hume and Kant, but here we will linger on the ideas of Popper and Feyerabend as the "perfect ends" of this reasonably coherent evolvement.
In Popper's approach we witness how the secondary role is given to nature/physis and in that of Feyerabend we see how it is thrown out of the scenario altogether. Nevertheless, in both cases the dialectic is not brought to a standstill, as the human mastery of nature by the Feyerabendian formula "anything goes" should be drawn to its perfection in the same way as the human/sovereign mastery of nature should be totalized by the Kelsenian normativity of empty variables for which any content counts. 25 In Feyerabendian science, nature is totally excluded from the domain of law in order to be totally included into what now appears as the domain of the omni-potent human who may even discover/unearth new facts and in this way give birth to them. 26 But facts may not decide, they "alone are not strong enough for making us accept, or reject, scientific theories." 27 A human here 24 Here the complexity of the word state should be kept in mind: state could be conceived as a political unit, or just as an abstract term, synonymous to the term condition. This ambiguity is sometimes left deliberately in this article. 25 The generative development in epistemology from idealism or deductivism to anarchism is paralleled by the development in jurisprudence from positivism to nihilism. In fact, the distinction between them is only a historical matter; epistemological anarchism in its origin is epistemological idealism or deductivism; legal nihilism (or we may even call it analogously -legal anarchism or, at least, political anarchism) is in its origin legal positivism. These all ideologies as their ideological core have the same anthropological machine of the exclusionary-inclusion of physis under the domain of the mastery/sovereignty of a human. 33 To continue the poetics-the more dramatic situation happens in quantum mechanics, where quarks/facts appear whenever they want and wherever they want. What we have here is the "anything goes" situation "on the other (to the other) side of the margin", and human "mastery" of the un-earthment of facts stops here completely. He can do nothing with his theoretical "anything goes": whatever goes here -whatever goes there. Facts here escape all possible theories that can hold them at least for ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
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"connects" facts and theories with the aim of advancing the anarchistic propaganda of the human omni-potent law-giver in the domain of epistemology. , but the same does not happen at the first step in a deductive scheme, where human law-giving is always directional, always intentional, striving to unearth some facts, to 'make' experiences or to disallow this to happen (or, more poetically, to silence Nature). 51 But the first step in an inductive scenario presupposes the world as a totality of facts
52
. There is no human understood as some unique fact therein (anthropocentric machine is deactivated); the human is undifferentiated from facts, and, conversely, all facticity is a human/world; it is a plane of pure immanence-a plane of pure-physis. The first inductive step completes the onto-logy of this scene. In the second step nothing that is or exists separates or experiences separation. There is no other ontology there besides that of the first step. Therefore, essentially all is left there, in this plane of pure immanence. The second step, if it implies the separation of something that is (i.e. non-natural law), is already condemned to being the first step in the deductive scenario, and it also implies the "creation" of the plane of non-existence .
But the whole project of the mathematization of nature and phenomena is conducted on the basis of a few preconditions of reasoning which, firstly, should be understood as ontological statements, although they appear to be epistemological.
According to Rule IV:
In 53 In some sense, there is no such thing as inductivity at all, i.e. with the first and, especially, the second step; thus completed inductivity is only an ideological tool to produce a logocentric basis for deductivity. If we would make the opposite and turn the vector from deductive back to the inductive, at the very initial moment of the turn only facts in their autonomy would remain, thus opening the plane of absolute immanence, and the law shall be left therein as fact-ed. The inductive nexus between facts and laws is impossible. If the proper scheme of deduction might be this:
Then the proper scheme of induction is this: 59 The founder of physics, who never had meta-physical pretenses, should be the philosopher of the one/pure plane of immanence. But everything changes when the second plane "is born", the scene (which at first appears as induction with all of its duality) is very quickly and inevitably inverted and, probably most important, this new initially epistemological configuration starts acquiring modern ontological and political contours.
THE ONTOLOGY OF MODERN POLITICS
In this epistemological context the other scenario (the deductive/transcendental one), through the transformation into modern ontological one, finally becomes a political one in the Schmittean sense. In the end it turns into an existential annihilation as physical killing, as disposing of the physical life of the human. 60 The ontology of this scenario is anti-onto-logical and meta-physical. . 58 For example, see: "for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis" (ibid.: 371). 59 Of course, there is much naivete in Newton's philosophy, especially as related to conception of God and Nature itself, and he is not so innocent with respect to the anthropological machine (the whole format of the formulation of the rules of reasoning-that we are to admit … , we must assign … , we are to look up …-is the key indicator of that). But there is no room for "anything goes" in his approach; it is much more the world of natural "things" that appear (see ibid.: 270 (Rule I)) and, by the same token, laws of nature come into existence. 65 More precisely, the word no-thing is incorrect here-being one more exponent of conceptual disfunction-as it is exactly thing-ness that is non-existent; the more correct word here would be no-fact. 66 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, supra note 3, p. 36. 67 In some sense, the relationship between Christian and political theologies is analogous to the one between Popperian and Feyerabendian epistemologies-it is of a generative kind; second is already programmed in the first. 68 Walter Benjamin, "Theologico-Political Fragment," supra note 61: 313. With respect to the main idea-i.e. that the transcendental apparatus in the domain of the political is more and more replaced by an apparatus of immanenceit can be said that it is not replaced but more and more appears to be stripped bare. But the more it (i.e. the transcendental apparatus) is bare, the more we are 74 For Schmitt, who the law-giver is-one man/person or a mankind/people as represented through the apparatus of the democratic mechanism-is a critical, essential difference. But for the positivist theory of law, with which the Schmittean one shares the same germ and which has an exclusionary-inclusion machine (with norms as empty variables being its gears) of a total scale at its ideological core, essentially it does not matter who the machinist is-whether man or people.
environmental regulation/politics is only this: that some areas may remain as they are, while others may not. And, still more important, this regulation may be exploited by keeping in mind precisely this logical form. It is a convenient tool for the politics of existential annihilation (i.e. annihilation of what is as-it-is in the unprotected areas), convenient also because it allows for the creation of the visibility of its very opposite activity.
Another key example is more Schmittean, as it concerns the friend-enemy and peace/neutrality-war/conflict distinction(s). According to Schmitt, politics is always (i.e. as a matter of definition) about enmity and war; but it always represents itself as a relation of friendship and peace. The images of the absolute revolution, leading to the absolute friendship or the absolute peace, are selfcontradictory and self-eliminating. If all of us are friends then, by that fact, there will be no friends; there has to be an enemy, for a friend to be-"these two 75 It is like approaching a source of radiation by losing the layers of defense. 76 Or, in other words, it is like the elimination of the final layer of defense. 77 In this context we may ask why we are not allowed to live in protected areas or, at least, why is our activity is so limited there? It is a human paradox in itself to protect (and, this way, to distance) nature from a human. Also-how is the tree outside our window different from the tree in the nature park? By creating protected areas we make all the remaining earth an unprotected or, at least, less protected area. Otherwise, every tree should be equally important and protected.
That means that the fundamental and even existential necessity of a modern state and its government is the environment of the society as not existing in a condition of salus populi. An unhappy, sick, ailing society is the existential necessity of this (i.e. modern) form of government and state to the extent that this form of government and state needs to make society unhappy or sick in order to exist.
Otherwise, what is the purpose of government if society is already in the condition of salus? Therefore, rather paradoxically, the social contract theories and the forms of government they propose or initiate are the main causes of the spread of social ills. In some sense, modern government not only has to prove that something is wrong with/in the society-it has to make it wrong. Otherwise modern states and governments have only one way out: to disband themselves. Either way, the outcome is the same in all cases: society as-it-is must not remain as-it-is. If it is not in the condition of salus (really or allegedly, the latter being the more likely case), then it must be changed; if it is in the condition of salus, it also must be changed. In other words, it must be changed perpetually and not remain as-it-is. 
THE DIMENSIONS OF MIND AND THE MISSION OF PHILOSOPHY
The function of language is to fragment sense (or perception) 84 or, in other words, to provide forms of sense. But to fragment sense is not to make sense, and not even to correspond to some-'thing' in sense. Instead, at the most fundamental level the function of language is to create a non-sense (more usually named as nothing or no-thing-ness), a non-sensed fragmentation.
The simplest syntactic form available to speakers of English for the linguistic (re-)presentation of the event is in the form 'the boy moves'. Its simplicity seemingly mirrors an equivalently simple event. The event is presented as having the two-part structure of nominal participant + physical process. This division … corresponds to nothing in the percept itself. Thus, in the act of linguistic presentation a crucial change has been introduced, which is facilitated by the simplicity of the syntactic form. The linguistic form constitutes a model, which strongly influences the interpretation of such precepts, since it requires the event be analysed into these two parts before it can be communicated. However, the precise wording should read: thing is not, just as history too is not. Thing, if it is, "is" only a linguistic fragment of life. Even if we conceive verbs as names of facts, then they are also, in this respect, things. When we taste some-"thing", we taste and, together, name the taste (for example, "sweet"), i.e. we make taste a thing. And in this moment language is used in Wittgensteinian terms;
however, the name/thing of the taste "comes" from the linguistic past. Therefore, we could clarify the aforementioned statement even more: thing "is" just as history too "is" when language is used and when language is not used thing is not and history too is not. Once again, figuratively speaking, things are like the maps of the world/experience but not the world/experience itself.
Additionally, things (as linguistic 'beings') are a distinctive part of the human
Umwelt

92
. The hypothesis that in an animal Umwelt there are no things is viable even though, as a matter of Uexküllian logic, the Umwelten of living-beings should be totally separated from and inaccessible to each other. To understand this idea and its importance we should concentrate on the word "Welt/world".
First of all, world is a convenient linguistic tool to impute the ideology of (1) synchrony and (2) In this context we could undertake an imaginative experiment. When I look at and sense the redness of an automobile standing nearby and imagine a man in/from ancient Greek looking at and sensing the redness of the petals of the roses growing near his house, what might be the difference in our senses? There is none in terms of essence. In this respect and with some reservation concerning the use of the word world, we can say that the world has not changed at all; it is absolutely the same world in ancient Greece and in our times. But we know that it has changed dramatically; however, this change is constituted not by our senses but by our mind. Let us continue the imaginative experiment. If we would take an ancient Greek man from his environment and throw him into today's environment, he would surely be in complete shock and would definitely state that the world has 94 This conception, of course, could be compared to that of Heidegger's ("the animal is poor in world" (Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, supra note 92, p. 176 et seq.) where being poor means being deprived of a world (ibid., p. 195 et seq.); however, of course, it is also very different. Heidegger's conception is founded on a tri-partite scheme of a distinction between thing (stone), animal and man, where all parts are codetermined by each other and this way (i.e. as a matter of ideology) dependent on each other. The distinctions between those three parts are articulated in a complicated and unique manner. It appears that the most complicated part for Heidegger is that of an animal as such and as different from a man. There he relies on very subtle ideas: distinction between doing and acting as human behavior different from that of an animal as a driven performing (ibid., p. 237), conceptions of disinhibiting ring, within which animal is surrounded (ibid., p. 255), and "profound boredom as a fundamental attunement of human Dasein" (ibid., p. 282). Here everything is related to different and perhaps simpler ideas. First, a world together with a thing here is explained as not existent (therefore, it would be not a precise statement that world here corresponds to No-thing; it is exactly Thing of all things which is-not). Being worldless or world poor here could be explained as exactly the mode of existence -what-is is worldless or world poor and, if we want to add some ethical chilly here, there is nothing bad in all that, only that animal Umwelt is, more exactly, Um-'welt'; 'Um' here signifies the margin of the world. However, that also does not mean that we are now on the side of Gray, with his rather rough negation of Heidegger's approach (see John Gray, Straw Dogs, supra note 1, p. 48-52). The problematic nature of Gray's attack on Heidegger's idea ushers from methodology, which Heidegger himself unintentionally points out at the very beginning of his corresponding passage, but then somehow strangely passes by: "by what path can and should we gain access to the living character of the living being in its essence? In what way should life, the animality of the animal … be made accessible to us?" (Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, supra note 92, p. 179). In other words, how can an animal Umwelt be reached by us and conceived as it is in its totality? This simple insight of a primary problem makes all the conceptions of animal (including the one developed here) mere hypotheses and, if analytical rigor is our guide, no single one of them, including Gray's, could be treated as being totally un-humanistic.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014 143 changed dramatically. 95 But we have just stated that, in some respects, the world has not changed at all: the redness of/in ancient Greece and redness of/in our times is still the same. We are still today unable to see ultraviolet rays or to hear the ultrasound; there is nothing absolutely new or different from what an ancient Greek could sense. This unchanged world is the world of our senses, which is revealed to us in the same way as it was revealed three or more thousand years ago.
Now let us imagine a cat from ancient Greece, which we would take from that environment and would throw into a contemporary environment. Would it be in shock? Would it notice (if not conceive) that the world has changed dramatically, that it is absolutely a different world? Would it notice that there is a tremendous difference in the redness of a rose and the redness of an automobile? Although the world (i.e. Umwelt) of a cat is, in some respects, not accessible to us, the external behavior of it would probably show that the cat will not be in shock, and certainly not experiencing the same shock as an ancient Greek human. It is highly probable that a cat would just run in the same second to some shelter, maybe to a forest, to some place where it could catch a mouse and would not care at all about the dramatically changed world. "everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated 95 Also, for example, an automobile, in some sense, was just near to an ancient Greek-it was "lying" in the same potentiality of being made as it is "lying" now; the ancient 97 Such a conception may be understood as an alternative to those who preprogram transcendental apparatus. In this context it could be convenient to use the metaphor of a diving-dress (le scaphandre). For example, when I see some-"thing" we may say that this "seeing" does not coincide with the "I". This is the maneuver of inside-al transcendence leading to Cartesian cogito ergo and turning senses into a kind of a diving-dress for the mind/language-use/subject/"I". Or, otherwise, it is exactly the latter that may be turned into a kind of a outside-ly transcendetal diving-dress (or otherwise depicted by the metaphor of "glasses" as done by Kant) for the sensing. In our context human is understood as constituted by the continuous interplay (or inversion) of those alleged diving-dresses both this way opening-up the plane of pure immanence/existence (not to be mixed with total immanence; see further in the text 103 In some sense, here the language itself, i.e. English, is at fault, because it has a "thing" component in the concept -No-thing. This situation allows at least some part of an analysis made here but also it makes the analysis at the conceptual level rather difficult in the sense that it is hard to maintain coherency. In German or, for example, in Lithuanian, the situation is very different-"Nothing" is called "Nichts" or "Niekas" respectively. However, the concept of mind may appear somewhat questionable here. Still, we cannot escape that our Umwelt is at least specific in the use of languagethinking. Our life consists of thinking and sensing, both hand-in-hand (therefore both concepts-mind and sense-sometimes are used interchangeably especially through translation as with common sense (Eng.) and sveikas protas (Lith.)) opening the world for us-our Umwelt which we only know for sure while other
Umwelten always remain at least partly hypothetical for us.
The hypothesis advocated therein is that in an animal Umwelt there are no things. This hypothesis may be reinforced by the mere fact that there is no evidence of any animals accumulating things in the same way as we accumulate property. In other words, there is no such activity as ownership or, in other more juridical words, property relations in that Umwelt. That should be related to the fact that in an animal Umwelt there is just no-thing (in the exact sense) to accumulate/own-animals live in the continuum of facts. Finally, all this has a direct impact on the fundamental problem of law-of the gap between is (or what-is) and ought. The underlying idea at the opening of this gap is the one of the detachment of law and "is", the un-relatedness of law and "is"
and, in this way, the inconceivability of natural law. Consequently, pure existentialism or anti-philosophy is exactly the 'place' where we should seek for the lost natural law, understanding all the political consequences of this undertaking.
And for that it is not enough just to make new political slogans such as "we shall be satisfied with what-is without any anxiety to change the world but, rather, to sustain it as it is". The change (or, more exactly, return) of the dimension of mind must support the recovery; and the mission of philosophy-which here appeared to be anti-philosophy, always tempted by first philosophy to change its anti-positionis to cultivate the mind-environment for this change.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
149
CONCLUSIONS
The undecidability apparently inherent in Schmitt's decisionism hides the fundamental problem of the concept of law. Even if the sovereign decides whether a situation of entirely situational law exists, the question remains whether this situation may exist without or before his decision. Schmitt's ideas on the administrative state show that this decision-as something separate from the existence of the situation and as risking the political-may be the cause of the degeneration of law equal to the loss of natural law in modernity.
The revival of natural law is possible only through an inquiry into the deeper layers of professional philosophy. At the level of epistemology we may find that natural law was isolated from the political-legal domain by transforming it into natural science and, in the very end, attempting to show that the latter proceeds deductively and in this way advancing the anarchistic propaganda of the human omni-potent law-giver in the domain of epistemology. However, this attempt was not so easy to accomplish and the cause is an essentially inescapable relic of the autonomy of facts. Moreover, at a closer inspection, the "opposition" between inductivity and deductivity is not only the problem of modern epistemology, but also a coherent diachronically structured modern ontology. Inductivity-with its first and the second planes-is the prerequisite or fundament of deductivity therein.
Otherwise law is 'fact-ed'-it is only as a fact and in no other way; there is no second plane there, especially in the form of law.
Modern epistemology has not only ontological but also political contours in the But besides the camouflage type of ontology, there is the direct logos of modern annihilatory political praxis-the real 'anti-onto'-logy, the real negation of existence. The originary "place" of this logos is in the basic structures of language.
We start to negate existence (or to speak about what-is-not) while we start to use
